Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 15

Number 2

Article 9

2-1-2015

Patent Harmonization in Biotechnology: Towards International
Reconciliation of the Gene Patent Debate
Molly Jamison

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil

Recommended Citation
Jamison, Molly (2015) "Patent Harmonization in Biotechnology: Towards International Reconciliation of
the Gene Patent Debate," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 15: No. 2, Article 9.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Patent Harmonization in Biotechnology: Towards
International Reconciliation of the Gene Patent Debate
Molly Jamison*

Abstract
Internationalpatent harmoniqation is.farfrom complete. In the field of biotechnology, the
patchwork of standards governing patentable subject matter is a growing cause for concern.
Divergent internationalstandards harmpatent holders who lack the certainty of knowing where
and to what extent theirpatents will be valid. Divergent standardsalso harmpatients who face
restricted access orprohibitively high costs for genetic testing. While many solutions have been
proposed, neither a new substantive treaty nor use of compulsory licensing are likely to provide
long-term solutions. Independent licensing coordinated by the WTO or WIPO is a far better
solutionfrom the perspective of both patent right integrity and internationalpublic health.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) is a growing component of both global trade and
government policy decisions. As the world marketplace becomes increasingly
integrated, patent holders seek ways to maintain their exclusive rights.' There has
been progress towards international harmonization over the years in the form of
coordinating procedural requirements and ensuring minimum standards of
protection. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) adoption of the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS)2 was
particularly important to the growing harmonization of patent regimes
internationally. However, large disparities remain in substantive patent rights,
including in standards of patentability, that lead to a fragmented international
intellectual property regime.
The field of biotechnology may be especially sensitive to the fragmented
nature of international standards of patentability. After the international
biotechnology industry's rapid expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, both the
number of biotechnology patents and the scope of patentable subject matter
increased significantly. During this time, gene patents were widely available in
multiple countries, resulting in thousands of human gene patents.' Despite
efforts to harmonize international patent regimes, recent legal challenges to the
validity of gene patents highlight the uneven nature of international policy
regarding the patentability of human gene sequences.
The patentability of genes has been questioned in a number of countries,
including the United States, Australia, and Canada, as well as in the European
Union (EU).4 Several of these challenges arose out of the controversy
surrounding the U.S. biotechnology firm Myriad Genetics, which owns patents
on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with breast and ovarian cancers.
Myriad's overbroad patents, along with the company's strong enforcement of its
IP rights, led to controversies in multiple countries.' The United States Supreme

1
2

See Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: The Necessit and Strategy
for a PragmaticOutcome, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 127, 128 (2011).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].

3

See Stephen H. Schilling, DNA as Patentable Subject Matter and a Narrow Frameworkfor Addressing the
Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 DUKE' L.J. 731, 769 (2011) (querying "whether wholegenome sequencing will infringe the thousands of gene patents that already exist").

4

See Bryn Williams -Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of Commercial
BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 123-24 (2002).

5

See id.
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Court invalidated Myriad's patents on isolated gene sequences. 6 Yet in many
other nations, Myriad's gene patents are still valid.
Resolving the international inconsistencies in gene patentability presents a
difficult problem. Inconsistent patent regimes can result in uncertainty among
biotechnology firms, as well as unequal access to genetic testing and health care
for patients. Due to the global nature of biotechnology, a solution will likely
need to come from international organizations. Some nations have argued for
amending TRIPS to ban patents on life forms. 7 But previous attempts at this
have failed, and it seems unlikely, given the WTO's "law-making deficit,"' that
any substantive response will occur in the future. Other individuals have
advocated state use of the compulsory licensing provisions in Article 31 of
TRIPS, which would allow countries to circumvent patent holders' right to
restrict access to their inventions.' However, reliance on compulsory licenses is
not a viable solution in the long run, given that developed nations have criticized
developing nations for "abuse" of these provisions and, by threatening
economic sanctions, effectively limited compulsory licensing."o
There are viable alternative solutions. Compared to compulsory licenses,
private licensing agreements negotiated between biotechnology firms increase
the favorability of terms for both sides and improve their ability to respond
quickly to dynamic innovations." Because of the potential for firms to engage in
restrictive licensing, the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) are in the best position to intervene in an administrative capacity to
ensure coordination and access.
This Comment discusses the international response to divergent patent
standards with a focus on the example of gene patents. Section II provides a
6

See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109
(2013) [hereinafter Myriad Genetics].

7

See generaly Cydney A. Fowler, Comment, Ending Genetic Monopolies: How the 1IRIPS Agreement's
Failure to Exclude Gene Patents Thwarts Innovation and Hurts Consumers Worldwide, 25 Aii. U. INT'L L.

REv. 1073 (2010).
8

Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradgms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41
CONN. L. REV. 861, 906 (2009). Strandburg grounds this claim in the "rarity and non-precedential
character of WTO panel decisions." Id.

9

See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31; seealso Donna M. Gitter, InternationalConflicts over Patenting Human
DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union:An Argumentfor Compulsoy licensing and a
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001).
See Mingchanok Tejavanija, Note, A New Kind of Drug War: Thailand's Taking on the Pharmaceutical

10

[ndustry to Improve Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs Through the Use of Compulsoy licensing, 28 ARiz.
INT'L & CoMP. LAw 659, 673-74 (2011).
I

J.

See Janet Hope, Open Source Genetics: Conceptual Framework, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE
LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOlS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY

REGIMES 171-72 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009).
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brief overview of the gene patent debate and international standards on
patentable subject matter. Section III then explores more recent international
efforts at coordination, including the WTO and WIPO, and measures their
relative success. Section IV describes some of the concerns with differing patent
standards, focusing particularly on the field of biotechnology. Finally, Section V
offers potential solutions to increase coordination between countries in order to
encourage greater harmonization within the field of gene patents.
II. THE GENE PATENT DEBATE
The decision to permit patenting of certain subject matter, such as genetic
sequences or genetic tests, "generally rests with the national patent authorities."1 2
Each national authority must decide the scope of patentability based on public
policy and an analysis of whether allowing the patenting of a given subject
matter would be "beneficial or detrimental to the advancement of science and
human knowledge."" In the U.S., Congress broadly determines what constitutes
patentable subject matter. However, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the Federal Circuit largely interpret what technologies and
innovations are patentable. In contrast, the European Patent Office can issue
directives within the EU, but individual nations retain the ability to decide issues
of patentability and patent enforcement within their territory regardless of other
European nations' policies.
The debate over gene patentability follows the traditional arguments for
and against patents as a whole. Generally, the benefits of patents accrue privately
(via incentives to further invention) and publicly (via the publication of findings
that increase public knowledge). Yet the issuance of broad patents may actually
hinder research when their scope and number limit researchers' access to
necessary technology. Patents may also limit public access to new innovations
and raise the cost of diagnostic tests for patients. Human gene patents implicate
additional ethical concerns about the commodification of public health. Because
of this conflict, gene patents have proven controversial since they were first
issued in the 1980s. 14 For decades, scholars, human rights activists, and
international organizations have argued for and against allowing patents of
human genes. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Myriad Genetics reflects
the ongoing debate."

12

Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontierof FDA Regulationfor Genetic Materials, 98
IowA L. Ri;v. 1399, 1401 (2013).

13

Id

14

See Schilling, supra note 3, at 732.

1s

See Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107-20.
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A. Primer on Gene Patents and Genes
When referring to gene patents, it is important first to distinguish between
the human genome, which is not patentable, and genes, which are patentable."
The human genome refers to the entirety of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
present in each human cell, whereas genes are particular sections of DNA."
Gene patents typically issue in one of four categories: (1) genes, in whole or in
part, including claims to isolated nucleotide sequences;" (2) proteins that the
genes encode and their function in organisms; (3) vectors used for the transfer
of genes from one organism to another; and (4) genetically modified cells or
organisms, processes used for the making of genetically modified products, and
the uses of genetic sequences or proteins for genetic tests." These categories are
not distinct, and there are frequent overlaps. For example, a company may hold
patents on the gene sequence itself as well as patents on the proteins encoded by
those genes.20 Because of the potentially broad coverage of gene patents,
ownership of the rights to a single gene sequence can result in a "near monopoly
on diagnostic tests and treatments for widespread and serious ailments."2 1 This
creates the opportunity to "extract rents" from researchers and scientists who
are interested in developing further diagnostic tests, resulting in both higher
medical costs and decreased availability to patients.22

16

See Gitter, supra note 9, at 1628-29.

17

See, for example, "DNA," THE HUMAN BODY BOOK: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO ITS STRUCTURE,
FUNCTION,
AND
DISORDERS
(Steve
Parker
ed.,
2009),
available at http://
search.credoreference.com/content/entrv/dkbody/dna/0.
These patents are most often the cause of controversy. Consider, for example, patent 5,622,829,
previously held by Myriad Genetics, which claims complementary DNA (cDNA) forms of
BRCA1 alleles. See Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and
Society, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on PatientAccess to Genetic Tests, D EP'T OF
HEALTH
. AND
HUMAN
SERVICES
(April
2010),
available
at
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/ SACGHS patents.report_2010.pdf.

18

19

See Kristen L. Burge, Personali.edMedicine, Genedc Excepionalism, and the Rule of Law: An Analysis of
the PrevailingJustficationfor Invaldating BRCA 1/2 Patents in Association of Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO, 8 WASH.J.L. TECH. & ARTS 501, 513-14 (2013).

20

Myriad held U.S. patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as well as genetic byproducts and
various mutations of these genes. As a result, Myriad was the sole U.S. provider of genetic
diagnostic tests for breast and ovarian cancer risk. See Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene
Patents and licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testingfor Inherited Suscepibiliy to Cancer: Comparing
Breast and Ovarian Cancers ith Colon Cancers, 12(4) GENET. MED. 15, 15 (Supp. 2010).

21

22

Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious
Reconceptualiation of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303, 308 (2002).
See id. at 308-09.
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B. International Expansion of Gene Patentability
The growth of the biotechnology (biotech) industry is "closely linked to the
expansion of patent law into the protection of life forms."23 In the U.S. and the
EU, the trend of increased patent protection reflects a concerted effort of
legislatures, courts, and patent offices-potentially the result of governmental
pressure to attract biotechnology investment through more liberal patent
standards.24 Biotech companies use patents "as a signaling device to stock
markets that they have control of vital or fundamental technologies."2 5 Patent
offices and courts, especially those in many developed countries, are more
inclined to grant patents liberally in order to attract biotech investment.26
Industrialized nations have successfully attracted biotechnology firms;
entities from developed nations currently hold 97% of all patents worldwide.27
In the field of biotechnology, the divide between developed and developing
nations is especially pronounced.28 Gene patents follow this trend, with U.S.
inventors filing more international patents on DNA sequences than any others,
including the combined total of all inventors in the EU.29

23

GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRIES:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 193 (2d ed. 2009).

24

25

See Gitter, supra note 9, at 1636 (citing Peter Drahos, Biotechnolog Patents, Markets and Morality, 21
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 441, 442-43 (1999), for the proposition that governments have
increased the number of patents granted without considering the "broader public ethic").
Drahos, supra note 24, at 446.

26

See id. By authorizing gene patents, the Australian federal government has expressed strong
support for the development of an Australian biotechnology industry. See generaly Centre for
International Economics, Economic Analysis of the Impact of Isolated Human Gene Patents, IP
AUSTRALIA
(May
2013),
available
at
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/IPA-Final ReportHumanGenePatents
2013.pdf; Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, The Australian Medical Biotechnology Industry and Access to
Intellectual Property- Issues for Patent lawn Development, 23 SYDNEY L. REv. 347 (2001).

27

See WHO HUMAN GENETiCS PROGRAMME, GENETics, GENoMiCS AND THE PATENTING OF
DNA: REVIEW OF POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HEAL TH IN DEVEILOPING COUNTRIES 20
(2005), available at http://www.who.int/genomics/FullReport.pdf (noting that "[m]ore than 80%
of the patents granted in developing countries belong to residents of industrialized countries,
usually multinational corporations from the most advanced economies").
A large proportion of the biotech industry is centered in the U.S., including most of the venture
capital, most of the scientific activities, and a large percentage of the consumer market. See
Timothy Caulfield, Gene Patents, Human Clones and Biotechnology Policy: The Challenges Created by
Globali.ation, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 713, 718 (2003); Elisa M. Buctuanon, Globaligation of Biotechnolog,
20 NEw GENETICS AND SociTY 25, 26 (2001) ("[A~lthough the flow of biotechnologies across
national borders has grown increasingly in recent years, there is a tendency for this to agglomerate
in developed countries, particularly the US, where the socio-economic and politico-institutional
environments facilitate their development and commercial exploitation.").
See GENIETiCs, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supbra note 27, at 20.

28

29
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An important change in law facilitated this expansion in biotechnology. In
1980, Diamond v. Chakrabaryfo opened the possibility of patenting isolated gene
sequences in the U.S. In overturning the USPTO's previous decision,
Chakrabarty allowed the patenting of a genetically modified bacterium for the
bioremediation of oil spills.' This decision significantly influenced the
intellectual property regimes of other nations, as many began allowing patents
on genes.32 Around the same time, legislation that allowed public universities to
patent their discoveries further encouraged the commercialization of generelated products.33 Public institutions in the EU and the U.S. now own
approximately 30% of the patents on DNA filed between 1996 and 1999.34 This
move towards patent harmonization in international agreements, including the
TRIPS agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
further contributed to broader acceptance of gene patents, even in nations
whose economies do not feature large biotechnology industries.35
C. Increased Challenges to Gene Patents
In the 1980s and 1990s, the standards governing patentable subject matter
expanded, particularly in the field of biotechnology, and the issuance of biotech
patents, including gene patents, increased. In the U.S., the annual number of
biotechnology patents peaked in 1998 with the issuance of 5,977 biotech
patents." After 2000, biotech patent issuance declined and then leveled off.3 7
There are multiple explanations for the leveling off of biotech patents, but it is
notable that, after 2000, a growing number of parties challenged the validity of
gene patents in courts and legislatures. The shift in policy seems to have been
"largely stimulated by a convergence of a general social unease, the emergence of
3o

Diamond v. Chakrabarty et al., 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

31

See id. at 315-17.

32

See Williams-Jones, supra note 4, at 125 ("The 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty was a landmark decision, and significantly influenced Canadian and international
patent law."); Kate M. Mead, Gene Patents in Australia A Game TJheory Approach, 22 PAC. RIM L. &
Poi,'Y J. 751, 755 (2013) (noting "that Australian courts often use U.S. court opinions as
persuasive authority for determining patent cases").

33

For example, the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 introduced incentives for universities and public
institutions to patent the products of their research. See GENETICS, GENOMICS AND THE
PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 20.

34

Id.

35

See \Villiams-Jones, supra note 4, at 125.

36

Richard Li-Dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scienfic Research: The Case for Compusory
licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALEJ.L. & TECH. 251, 255 (2008).

37

See GENiETics, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 20 (discussing the

"notable drop in the past three years in the number of DNA patents granted").
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preliminary data and literature on the possible adverse practical ramifications of
gene patents, and several high-profile patent protection controversies.'>38 Many
of these challenges arose out of the controversy surrounding Myriad's strong
enforcement of its patent rights.3 ' Recent cases, particularly the Myriad Genetics
case in the U.S., suggest the pro-patent trend of the 1990s and 2000s may be on
the verge of reversing course.
In 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology, a U.S. nonprofit
scientific society of researchers and scientists, challenged Myriad's BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene patents along with their patents on diagnostic testing.40 Following
years of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Associationfor Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics on the question of whether human genes were
patentable. 1 The Court held that isolated human genetic sequences were not
patentable,42 effectively invalidating thousands of gene patents in the U.S. 4 3 This
recent decision represents a huge shift in the legal treatment of gene
patentability. U.S. courts had allowed gene patents for decades, ever since the
decision in Chakrabarty in 1980." The Myriad Genetics case, then, reversed
previous U.S. policy. While the full effects of this decision are still unknown, the
case has drawn international attention once again to the question of gene patent
validity and may influence other countries experiencing similar pending legal
challenges.

38

Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes:An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24
NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1091 (2006).

39

See Williams-Jones, supra note 4, at 139-40 (surveying critical responses in Europe to Myriad's
patents).

40
41

See generaly Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d
365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2115.

42

See id. at 2116.

43

See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) ("It is estimated that the PTO has issued 2,645 patents claiming 'isolated DNA' over
the past twenty-nine years, and that by 2005, had granted 40,000 DNA-related patents covering,
in non-native form, twenty percent of the genes in the human genome.") (citations omitted).

44

See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317 ("The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely
to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has
already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be
available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind
from probing into the unknown ....
[W]e are without competence to entertain [arguments
warning against the hazards of gene patenting] . . . .").
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The EU patent regime is comparable to the U.S. system in terms of the
standard of patentability45 as well as in what constitutes patentable subject
matter.46 The 1998 Biotechnology Directive of the European Patent Office
(EPO) explicitly discussed gene patents and urged nations to harmonize how
each member state protected biotechnological inventions, including gene
patents.4 7 Unlike American patents, however, European patents issued by the
EPO function as a "bundle" of national patents.48 A patent is subject to judicial
decisions on its validity and enforcement by different member states that are
controlling only within their jurisdiction. There is currently no court to
promulgate an EU-wide determination of a patent's validity once issued by the
EPO.49 This system can have complicated effects when the validity of a patent is
in dispute between countries, with the potential for a patchwork of differing
patent decisions among EU members.
Despite the EPO's explicit acceptance of gene patents, the EU has
witnessed challenges over many gene patents, including Myriad's BRCA1 gene
patents. In early 2002, controversy arose over the issuance of patents for the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and for a method of diagnosing breast and ovarian
cancer to Myriad Genetics.so Stakeholders launched an opposition under Article
99 of the European Patent Convention (EPC)." The EPO initially invalidated
one of Myriad's BRCA gene patents, and it was reinstated only after the patent
was amended and narrowed in scope.5 2 Currently, the EU continues to allow
patents on isolated gene sequences when a function is identified for the
sequence.
45

46

In order to be patentable material under European law, an invention, paralleling U.S. criteria,
must: "(1) comprise patentable subject matter, (2) be new, (3) be 'susceptible of industrial
application,' and (4) involve an 'inventive step."' Gitter, supra note 9, at 1644.
Like the US, the EU has been issuing gene patents since the 1990s. See Nicol & Nielsen, supra
note 26, at 354.

47

See Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 9, (noting that "exclusion from patentability
of plant and animal varieties and of essentially biological process ... have created uncertainty"
and that "harmoni[z]ation is necessary to clarify the ... uncertainty").

4

See Kali Murray & Esther van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in Europe and the United States:
The Myriad Example, 19 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 304 (2011).

49

See id.

so

See id. at 321-23.

si

See id. at 322.

52

See Myriad Wins European Patent Appeal on Cancer Test, RiEUTERS (Nov. 20, 2008, 10:20 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/20/myriad-patent-idlNN2041020920081120 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014).

53

However, there is an exception for "diagnostic methods practiced on the human body";
diagnostic gene sequencing does not occur within the human body and so would not be excluded
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With respect to human gene patents, Australia's official position is that "a
DNA or gene sequence that has been isolated may be patentable" so long as "it
follows the other statutory rules of patentability."5 4 This position has been
challenged multiple times throughout the last decade. In 2002, the Attorney
General ordered the Australian Reform Commission to "examine the laws and
practices governing intellectual property rights over genetic materials and related
technologies, with a particular focus on human health issues."" In 2011,
legislators in Parliament proposed the Patent Amendment (Human Genes and
Biological Products) Bill in order to exclude isolated DNA segments from
patentability." Although this bill remains under consideration by Parliament, a
2013 case was filed to challenge Myriad Genetics' gene patents.s" Despite the
fact that Australian courts often use U.S. court opinions as persuasive
authority," this challenge was unsuccessful. After a subsequent second appeal,
Australia's Federal Court upheld the validity of Myriad's gene patents in
September 2014."
Canada has taken a different approach to challenging gene patents--one in
which public validity of these patents contradicts widespread private
circumvention and growing public health concerns. Gene patents are available in
Canada. In fact, Myriad continues to hold four gene patents in Canada for the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes."o Despite these patents, multiple private agencies in
Canada began using ''"round about methods' to avoid infringing the patents"
while still cutting costs, including brokering patient access to a BRCA research
project." Due to the cost of Myriad's licensing agreements for genetic testing,
the British Columbia Ministry of Health Services changed its official position in
from patentability. European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination art. 53(c) (Sept. 2013),
available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_ii_4 2.htm; see also
available at
(Dec. 13, 2007),
(EPC) R. 29(3),
Convention
Patent
European
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/r29.html (allowing patents on
gene sequence as long as the industrial application is disclosed in the application).
54

Mead, supra note 32, at 757.

ss

56

Austl. L. Reform Comm'n (ALRC), Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Healtb, ALRC
Report 99 (Aug. 2004), § 12, available at http://ww.alrc.gov.au/publications/12-patents-andhuman-genetic-research/impact-gene -patents -research.
See Mead, supra note 32, at 755.

57

See id.

5

See id.

s9

6

See Jamelle Wells, Court Dismisses Second Appeal to Overturn Ruling on Corporate Human Gene Patenting,
SEVEN NE~ws (Sept. 6, 2014, 7:08 AM), https://au.news.yahoo.com/nsw/a/24906725/court(last visited
dismisses-second-appeal-to-overturn-ruling-on-corporate-human-gene-patenting/
Nov. 6, 2014).
See Williams-Jones, supra note 4, at 141.

61

Id. at 142.

698

Vol. 15 No. 2

Gene Patent Harmonization

Jamison

2003 to permit health care facilities to use in-house BRCA testing-in violation
of Myriad's patents.62 The Ontario Ministry of Health signed on to a report
urging the Canadian Patent Act to exclude broad-based genetic patents and
include a strong public morality clause. 63
Because there is "great diversity" among the patent regimes and research
capacities of developing nations, it is more difficult to identify a clear approach
towards the patentability of genes in these nations.64 Brazil, China, and India
have comparatively well-developed biotechnology industries, but they differ in
their approaches to gene patents.6 ' Brazil plays an important role in plant
genetics but has signed the Convention on Biological Diversity, which excludes
genetic resources from patentability.66 Whether Brazil considers all human genes
specifically excluded from patentability is ambiguous. 67 In contrast, China has
actively encouraged biotechnology investment by loosening its patentability
standards. The State Intellectual Property Office clarified that China does not
allow patents on life forms, but it does allow patenting of genes. Similarly,
India has allowed patents on genetic materials, but gene patents are controversial
and may violate India's Patent Act.69
The international approach to gene patents is fractured and in flux. While
some developed nations have been moving towards refusing gene patents,
others have not. Developing nations do not have a clear position either, resulting
in a patchwork of worldwide patentability standards for human genes.

62

63

See id. at 142. Myriad responded by sending "cease and desist" letters to the Ontario and British
Columbia governments for violating their BRCA patents. Ontario ignored Myriad's legal claims
and decided to continue financing the testing in Canadian laboratories. See Laura Eggertson,
Ontario Dejies U.S. Firm's Genetic Patent, Continues Cancer Screening, 166(4) CMAJ News, Feb. 19,
2002, available at http://www.cmaj.ca/content/166/4/494.1.full.
See Williams-Jones, supra note 4, at 143.

65

See GENETICS, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 24.
See id.

66

See id at 25.

67

See id. at 26. Some argue that Brazil's approach to the patenting of genetic resources has raised
barriers for researchers and prevented new investments in biotechnology. See, for example, Gabriel
Di Blasi, Current Barriers to Biotech in Brazil. LIFE SCIENCES INTELL. PROP. REV. (July 31, 2013),
availableat http://www.ifesciencesipreview.com/article/current-barriers-to-biotech-in-bra7il.
See GENETICS, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 27.

64

68
69

See id. at 29 ("Nor does the Indian patent system appear to allow patents on genes or cells."). It is
currently unclear whether human genes are patentable in India. Under India's Patents Act, signed
in 1970, naturally occurring substances are not patentable, yet patents covering genetic material
have been granted. See Bhavishyavani Ravi, Gene Patents in India: Gauging Polig by an Analysis of the
GrantsMade by the Indian Patent Office, 18(4) JIPR 323 (2013).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL TREND TOWARDS HARMONIZATION
For the most part, global patent law has been moving towards
harmonization in the past decades. Despite vastly different industries, values,
and levels of development among countries, patent regimes have become
increasingly uniform. This push towards uniformity is due in large part to the
adoption of the TRIPS agreement and other international treaties.70 Since the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)"
in 1883, the "pendulum has been swinging towards greater harmonization
among countries," which in turn necessitates greater uniformity in standards for
patentable subject matter.72
A. The Trend towards Uniformity of Patent Protection
International patent cooperation has been extensive and largely successful
in coordinating procedural patent protections. Under the Paris Convention,
signatory countries committed to offer "the same opportunity to receive and
enforce patent right[s] [to other signatories] as they offer to their own
nationals."" Subsequent treaties have led to the standardization of the form of
patent applications, the procedure for applying, and the terms of protection.7 4
However, the term "international patent harmonization" was originally
understood to mean "unmform patent laws throughout the world," which would
require more uniform substantive, as well as procedural, standards." In the past,
multiple sources have called for "true harmonization," in which patent
applicants would complete a single patent application and receive global
protection." Advocates for this global patent system emphasize the
simplification of the law, ease of application and enforceability, and reduced
administrative costs. 77

70

71

72

See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent I.aw, 65 HASTINGS L.J.
153, 167 (2013).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the Stockholm
Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 155.

73

Stephen Yelderman, International Cooperation and the Patent-Antitmst Intersection, 19 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 193, 201-02 (2011).

74

See id. at 202.

75

Chun, supra note 1, at 137.

76

See id.

77

See id. at 138; see generaly John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKIIIY
TECH. L.J. 685 (2002).
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While true subject-matter harmonization is further off, more countries
have voiced concerns about differing substantive patent laws. Recognizing the
benefits of harmonization, WIPO and WTO members have signed a number of
treaties designed to coordinate internationally fragmented patent laws." These
international organizations serve a particularly important role by allowing
members to gain access to global public goods and protection under rules that
ensure at least a minimum level of IP protection." International organizations
"create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways" and
enforce agreements which otherwise would be unlikely to achieve consensus."o
As such, international organizations are in a unique position to influence and
enforce patent standards, including the patentability of genes. The WTO and
WIPO have both had a particularly strong role in the development and increased
harmonization of patent standards internationally.
B. The WTO and the TRIPS Agreement
Aware of the tension created by IP rights varying throughout international
economic relations, the WTO sought to create rules ensuring order and
predictability and allowing for systematic dispute resolution." These rules took
the form of the TRIPS agreement, which was established in 1994 as part of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. All 159 WTO members have agreed
as a "single undertaking" to adhere to TRIPS requirements. 82 These
requirements include: minimum levels of IP protection, a requirement to
provide effective enforcement procedures permitting action against any
infringement of intellectual property rights, and a prohibition on discriminating
between different industries by allowing different levels of IP protection.
Additionally, WTO members "may, but shall not be obliged to" implement
more extensive protections than required."

78

See generally Paris Convention, supra note 71; TRIPS, supra note 2; Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, opened for signature July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749,
T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, A3(iii), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
text.jsp?file id=283854.

79

See ROBERT S. JORDAN & WERNER

so

Id.
See

81

J. FELD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 236 (2001).

83

Intellectual Propertj: Protection and Enforcement,
World
Trade
Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/trips-e/ tripfqye.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.

84

Id. art. 1.1.

82
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Specifically relating to patents, Article 27 of TRIPS requires that "patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are
capable of industrial application."" The terms "inventive step" and "capable of
industrial application" are synonymous with "non-obvious" and "useful" as
defined in U.S. law." Consonant with Article 27's goal of "recogniz[ing] the
underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of
intellectual property," TRIPS still allows members a degree of flexibility
Members may, for example, "adopt measures necessary to protect public health
and nutrition" or "to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their socio-economic and technological development."" Members may also
exclude any invention that "is necessary to protect ordre public [public policy] or
morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant life or health."" Article
27.3 also allows explicit exclusions from patentability of "diagnostic therapeutic
and surgical methods for treatment" and "plants and animals . . . and essentially

biological processes.""o Even with these flexibilities in the agreement, TRIPS has
gone a long way towards harmonizing international patentability through
ensuring minimum IP protection and preventing discrimination between
industries.
There is some contention as to whether the language of TRIPS requires
countries to allow patents on DNA sequences." The language of Article 27
would not require countries affirmatively to declare DNA patentable, because a
particular subject matter is assumed patentable when it has not been listed
among the exceptions from patentability in Article 27.3. Nowhere does 27.3(b)
specifically reference genes or DNA.93 The WTO has remained relatively silent

85

Id. art. 27.1.

86

In this way, TRIPS could be read as analogous to U.S. standards. However, this is not explicit
within the agreement. See id. art. 27.1 n.5.

87

TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 27.

88

Id. art. 8.1.

89

Id. art. 27.2.

9o

Id. art. 27.3(b).

91

See GENETics, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 16.

92

These exclusions include "a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals; b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
process." TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.3.

93

See GENETiCS, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 17.
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on the patentability of genes, although more recent conferences have noted
some countries' growing concerns regarding access to diagnostic testing.94

C. The Role of WIPO
WIPO is the other major player in international patent regimes. WIPO was
established by the WIPO Conference of Stockholm in July 1967" and has been
associated with the United Nations since 1974.96 Its main objective is to promote
IP protection worldwide. Three activities-assisting with applications for
intellectual property rights, managing patent information, and promoting new
treaties to increase harmonization-facilitate this objective.98 WIPO is
responsible for the administration of the Paris Convention, which established
minimum standards of IP protection prior to the adoption of TRIPS." WIPO
also administers other patent agreements, including the Patent Cooperation
Treaty of 1970-designed to increase efficiency of international patenting-and
the Strasbourg International Patent Classification Agreement of 1971, which was
designed to establish global uniformity of classifications in international
patenting.0 o
WIPO is undoubtedly an important player in the international intellectual
property regime; however, the absence of enforcement mechanisms or dispute-

94

9s

96

See, for example, World Trade Organization, Trade Poliy Review, at 76, WT/TPR/S/177 (2005)
(pointing out that, as of 2005, the Commission "has not taken a position on Member States'
interpretations on the preferable type of protection for gene sequence"); see also World Health
Organization, World Trade Organization, and World Intellectual Property Organization Technical
Symposium, Access to Medicines, Patent Information and Freedom to Operate (Feb. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news11 e/trip_ 18feb11 summary e.pdf (briefly noting
the role of gene patents in vaccines for influenza and the human papillomavirus).
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
See KEITH E. MASKUS, THE EcoNoMics OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELL ECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIs: REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRs BUREAU 59 (1989).

9

See Polig, WORLD INTEL.ECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/

98
99

See MASKUS, supra note 96, at 59.

1

Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231; Strasbourg
Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification, March 24, 1971, 26 U.S.T. 1793,

(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
See id. at 60. The TRIPS agreement incorporated the standards established by the Paris
Convention and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
However, TRIPS adds a significant number of new or higher standards where the previous
agreements were thought inadequate. See Pmtection andEnforcement, supranote 81.

1160 U.N.T.S.

483. See generally Patent Law and Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/patents/en/#laws (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
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settlement procedures limits its efficacy.'o' Because of this, the WTO and
TRIPS, which have the benefit of institutional supremacy and the ability to make
international law, are viewed as authoritative over WIPO.102
Despite having limited ability to enforce directives, WIPO has issued many
of its own guidelines regarding genetic patents and resources. In the past decade,
it made an attempt to streamline and clarify policies as they apply to gene
patents: during negotiations for the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, it sought to
clarify patent requirements and exceptions, including those on "life forms and
public health patents."' 03 As a testament to the difficulty in coming to a
consensus, members were unable to agree, and negotiations were put on hold in
2006. 104
Because of an increasing number of voices in the debate over gene patents,
WIPO members have struggled to reach agreement regarding the scope of
patentable material. The Director General of WIPO, Dr. Francis Gurry, has
identified a shift in patent law from a "unimodular" to "interactive" system
where a broad range of actors influence patent policy.'o Patentability of specific
subject matter is no longer governed solely by economic analysis; it is also geared
towards ethical concerns and public health.
IV. CONCERNS WITH DIFFERING PATENTABILITY STANDARDS
Both TRIPS and the Paris Convention require a certain degree of
uniformity in patent protection internationally, but neither agreement places
significant limits on the scope of what subject matter may be patented. While
these agreements facilitate procedural harmony, there is a significant lack of
101

See MASKUS, supra note 96, at 64.

102

See Chidi Oguamanam, Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in the GlobalKnowledge Economy, 9
WAKiE FOREST INTE.L. PROP. L.J. 104, 138 (2009) (discussing the shift in "global intellectual
property law" from WIPO to the WTO); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shefting: The I RIPS
Agreement and New Dynamics ofInternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2122 (2004) (discussing superior institutional features of GATT/WTO for negotiating IP protection
standards).

103 WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Experts' Study on Exclusions from Patentable
Subject Matter and Limitations to the RJghts, SCP/15/3 Annex 1 (Feb. 3, 2011), available at
See also World
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15-3-annexl.pdf.
Intellectual Property Organization, Comments Made by Members and Observers of the SCP on Document
SCP/15/3 (October 11-15, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/
scp-j 5/scp 15_3-comments.pdf.
104
15

See Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION

http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/scp/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
See generally Francis Gurry, IntellectualProperty, Knowledge Polig and Globaliation,Going Global 2006
Sep.
21,
2006),
available at http://www.6cp.net/downloads/
(Helsinki,
Finland,
06helsinkigurry.pdf.
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international substantive uniformity of patentability standards. The debate over
the patentability of genes highlights this divergence. As some nations, such as
the U.S., invalidate patents on isolated gene sequences, others, including the EU
and Australia, continue to allow these patents to stand. This divergence has
important consequences, both for biotech firms craving predictability for their
research and development (R&D) efforts and for public health, as diverging
standards can limit access to and increase the costs of genetic testing.
A. International Concern over Divergent Policies
Patent law is inherently diverse for multiple reasons, including territoriality,
government use of patent law as a tool for economic growth, and cultural
factors that make each patent system unique. These sources of variation have led
to differences in how nations define patentable subject matter."' Internationally,
this can be a concern for individual businesses and patent holders, for
governments seeking to increase development, and for patients and consumers
who would benefit from access to biotechnology.
1. Private business and patent holder concerns.
A fragmented patent system with delays and unpredictable enforcement is
a "grave concern" for many businesses and start-ups for whom access to IP
rights is often essential for growth."' Jurisdictional uncertainty hinders patent
holders who are unclear about the extent of patent protection in a given
jurisdiction.'s Without certainty as to the scope of patent jurisdiction or
patentable subject matter, a firm cannot know if it will be able to secure patent
rights and may choose to avoid that jurisdiction as a whole. Uncertainty also
increases the cost to competitors who, not knowing whether a patent will be
granted, will often avoid spending resources on R&D as a consequence. 9 R&D
requires the investment and competition that only come with certainty of IP
rights.
As the world economy has become increasingly transnational, firms in
various industries have faced uncertainty in patent regimes. In the

106

See Chun, supra note 1, at 133 ("[1]n 1988, pharmaceutical products were not patentable in 49
countries, animal species in 45, methods for the treatment of the human or animal body in 44,
plant varieties in 44, biological processes for the production of plant varieties or animal species in
42, food products in 35, computer programs in 32, chemical products in 22, pharmaceutical
processes in 10, processes for the manufacture of food in 9, and microorganisms in 9.").

107

See id. at 136.

1os

See Cameron Hutchison & Moin A. Yahya, Infringement r the Intemadonal Reach of U.S. Patent Law,
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 241, 242 (2008).

109 See id. at 242-43.

Winter 2015

705

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLan,

telecommunications industry, where different components and databases may be
spread over multiple countries with differing patent regimes, this jurisdictional
uncertainty has erected many barriers to enforcement of patent rights."o
Concerns have also surfaced over international trade in unpatented components
of patented products. This was the concern in Deepsouth v. Laitram,' in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that unpatented components made outside the
territorial boundaries of U.S. law did not violate a combination patent when
assembled and sold outside the U.S.112 Subsequent cases have expanded the
scope of infringing activities to account for a more global marketplace, but
questions remain even in U.S. patent laws." 3 Because of international uncertainty
and patent disparities, international industries are "unable to know with certainty
what laws will be applied to their transactions," meaning it is difficult for
businesses to know if they are infringing."' Overlapping patents also put
businesses at risk of multiple judgments. Because of these risks, businesses have
a strong incentive to support harmonization of patent regimes internationally.
2. Government and state concerns.
Although inventors may be able to reap the rewards of patent protection
through free riding, national economies may not. A single national economy
cannot fully internalize the benefits and costs of patents. Instead, there is a
significant degree of interplay among nations' various patent systems with
international spillovers of benefits. Of course, some countries are better
positioned to benefit from increased investment in research than others.
Governments and national patent policymakers cannot make decisions in a
"bubble," because "nearly all domestic patent policies have effects, positive and
o10 Consider, for example, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), in
which the Canadian manufacturer of Blackberry was sued for infringement as a result of using
U.S. e-mail databases that were protected by a U.S. patent issued to NTP. Although Research in
Motion retained patent rights in Canada over its Blackberry product and use, this protection did
not extend into the U.S., and as a result it faced liability for an essential part of its product design.
11

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).

112

See id. at 532.

113

See Research in Motion, 418 F.3d at 1289-90; Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340
F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2005). These cases considerably expanded the post-Deepsouth jurisdiction of U.S. patent
enforcement. There remain complex questions when infringement occurs both inside and outside
the U.S. See Gregory C. Gramenopoulos, The ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Patents: Implicationsfor the
Global Marketplace. BNA INT'L PIRACY AND BRAND AWARENESS (May 2006), available at
http:/ /www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=c9459d08-6491 -4e068ab2-aal2db3045b7.
Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 108, at 255 (citing Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Lanw: The
Neglected Role of the InternationalLaw of PersonalJurisdictionin Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'l L.J. 373,
418 (1995).
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negative, outside a country's borders.""' By reducing the administrative burden
of duplicative patent prosecution, patent law harmonization stands to benefit
individual states due to the effect of IP on trade and development."'
That benefits flowing from public goods are not constrained by national
borders is a fundamental economic insight that explains the prevalence of free
riding."' Thus, the optimal level of protection in a given country depends not
only on policy incentives within the country itself but also on the policies of
neighboring countries, with the potential for either to benefit from or be harmed
by the other(s)."' For example, if one nation maintains a patent system but its
neighbor does not, two things will occur: first, firms will invest resources in
developing patentable innovations, and consumers in the first country will bear
the cost of developing the innovations in the form of above-marginal-cost
prices; but second, consumers in the second country will pay only the marginal
cost of reproducing the innovation and free ride off the investments of their
neighbors."9
This potential to externalize costs motivates nations to free ride off
neighboring states' IP protections. Within developed nations, however, the
desire to attract biotech industries creates powerful incentives to provide
stronger, more protective IP rights. Developed nations often seek uniform
standards of patentability and harmonization of patent prosecution to ensure
they are not bearing the costs of stronger IP rights.120 Furthermore, the interest
in promoting harmonization is stronger than even the allure of free riding
because the reactions of other nations can have far-reaching consequences.121
This does not mean that all developed nations have the same patent laws. For
115
116

117

Yelderman, supra note 73, at 203.
See Kevin Cuenot, Perilous Potholes in the Path 7'oward Patent Law Haronization, 11 U. FL A. J. L. &
PUB. POi 101, 102 (1999).
See Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce, New Face of Development Assistance: Public Goods and Changing
Ethics, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBIC Gooos 55, 55 (Eric Brousseau, Tom
Dedeurwaerdere & Bernd Siebenhiiner eds., 2012).

118 See Duffy, supra note 77, at 693-700 (discussing "jurisdictional externalities").

19

See id at 698.
This same calculus suggests that developing nations would have the opposite incentive-namely,
to free ride on strong IP rights in developed nations. But due to the minimum IP protection
required by TRIPS and the possible trade sanctions for violating the agreement, developing
nations have relatively few options but to abide by developed nations' IP policies.
121 See Ai.EXANDER STACK, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW: COOPERATION, HARMONIZATION, AND
120

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF WIPO AND THE WTO 30 (2011). The potential to free ride

among industrialized developed nations exists in a "crude sense" because investors will always be
eager to enter wealthy markets. However, between developed nations, the repercussions and
reactions by other countries make this unlikely, and there are no examples among developed
nations today bf this sort of behavior.
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example, Japan's patent regime has been accused of promoting "imitation[,] not
innovation" by ensuring that patents have extremely narrow claims, thus
opening more space for non-infringing imitations.122 But by and large, developed
nations seek more uniform patent regimes with stronger IP rights to ensure the
costs of these rights are distributed evenly and to avoid potential trade
consequences of lax IP laws.
Harmonization can also benefit developing nations. Innovators are
concentrated in the most industrialized, patent-friendly developed nations as a
result of disparities in patent regimes. Investors are less willing to enter markets
where the IP laws cannot guarantee protection for their inventions. One survey
found that 80% of chemical companies admitted they would not invest in India
due to a general perceived lack of IP protection.1 23 Similar claims have also been
made regarding China.'24 One way nations can counteract this concentration is
to strengthen their IP laws to match the most patent-friendly developed nations,
such as the U.S. For example, Singapore is now a more competitive location for
IP, but only since it strengthened IP rights and enforcement of infringement
penalties.'2 5 Similarly, Poland experienced a forty-fold increase in investment
after demonstrating a willingness to strengthen IP laws in the 1990s. 126 In hopes
of increasing investment in domestic infrastructure, stimulating domestic
industries, growing the domestic economy, and strengthening its biotech
industry, Australia also aggressively promoted stronger IP laws. 127
Harmonization provides one way for developing nations to become more
competitive in attracting investment and innovators vis-a-vis developed nations
with strong IP regimes.
3. International access concerns.
Inconsistent patentability standards and fragmented patent laws inhibit
patient access as well. Flexibilities in TRIPS can give rise to restrictive practices.
For example, Article 40(2) of TRIPS concerning "licensing practice conditions"
allows great flexibility for member states to determine the practices that

122

Id

123

See David Hindman, The Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on Foreign Investments in Developing
Economies, 23 ARIZ.J. INT'L & Coui'. L. 467, 473 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

124

See id.

125

See id. at 484.

126

One empirical survey found that increased foreign direct investments are positively correlated
with higher levels of intellectual property protection. See Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual
Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 277, 287 (2004).
See generally Economic Analysis of the Impact of IsolatedHuman Gene Patents, supra note 26.
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constitute abuse of IP rights. 28 This allows some nations to have expansive
protections that deter infringement and permit restrictive licensing. Thus, many
criticized Myriad's strict enforcement of their patent rights and restrictive
licensing practices for harming patients, yet under TRIPS Myriad's IP
enforcement was never considered an abuse of IP rights."
Patentability in particular highlights the divergence of interests between
developing and developed countries. Strong IP protections are generally
assumed to operate contrary to the best interests of developing countries.'" But
looser patent rights in developing nations have not necessarily led to increased
access for patients. Despite the fact that some developing nations allow gene
patents, even the largest developing nations account for only a small fraction of
patents, especially within the biotechnology field."'
B. Specific Concerns with Biotechnology and Gene Patents
The biotechnology field, perhaps more than others, requires global
cooperation.132 Unlike other industries, which can deliver competitive advantages
through faster or cheaper manufacturing, biotechnology companies gain
competitive advantages by virtue of IP protections for their inventions.' 33
Because of its reliance on patents, the biotechnology industry has a "greater
sensitivity to changes and developments in patent law" than other industries.134
The current system of uneven patent enforcement and legal uncertainty about
the patentability of DNA sequences could dampen innovation because of
uncertainty about recouping the high costs of R&D.

128
129

130

131

132

133

134

TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 40.
There has been no case brought before the WTO regarding Myriad, and the WTO has largely
remained silent on the issue of Myriad in particular and gene patent viability more generally. See
Index of Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
dispu-e/dispusubjects index e.htm#selectedsubject (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
See Yelderman, supra note 73, at 218.
See GENETICS, GENOMICS AND THE PATENTING OF DNA, supra note 27, at 27 (noting that, from
1980 to 1999, China filed seventeen international "patent families"-"al the patent documents
associated with a single invention"-whereas Brazil filed one, and the U.S. 5,610).
SeeJustine Pila, Bound Futures: PatentLaw andModern Biotechnology, 9 B.U.J. SC. & TECH. L. 326, 370
(2003).
See James H. Davis & Michele M. Wales, The Effect of Intellectual Propery on the Biotechnolog Industry,
in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 428 (F. Scott Kieff ed.,
2003).
Id
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The exceptionally high R&D costs of biotechnology and the high risk of
failure further contribute to the need for international harmonization.' Because
modern biotechnology often requires international sources of investment, it
constitutes a global industry.'36 Within this industry, the "ongoing differences in
national standards of patentability are a constant source of complaint."1 37
Without some uniformity of patentability standards, biotechnology firms face
legal and commercial uncertainty and risk piracy in countries with lesser patent
protections. Economies without a significant biotechnology industry in place are
at a disadvantage in attracting investment to develop these industries. Although
biotechnology holds the promise of significant revenue for countries exporting
biotech products,13 1 these companies are drawn to (the largely developed)
countries with stronger patent protection. Greater harmonization of patent
regimes could allow the economic benefits of biotechnology companies to be
enjoyed more widely, including in developing nations without strong
biotechnology industries.'
V. RESOLVING THE DIFFERING INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES
To GENE PATENTS
International organizations and agreements contribute to a degree of
international uniformity in patent regimes. This harmonization needs to expand
to patentable subject matter in the field of biotechnology and, in particular, to
gene patents. Due to the globalized nature of biotechnology, harmonization
would be difficult without international organizations" There are a number of
possible solutions available within existing international agreements, but these
solutions are not without their faults. This Comment will analyze two potential
remedies available within the TRIPS agreement and then propose a new solution
that may facilitate greater harmonization in the international approach to gene
patents.

13s
136

R&D costs for the biotechnology industry averaged from U.S. $1.4 billion to $1.9 billion in 2011.
See EconomicAnalysis ofthe Impact oflsolated Human Gene Patents, supranote 26, at 16.
See Pila, supra note 132, at 370.
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A. Potential Solutions Currently Available through
International Organizations
International organizations have played an integral role in the development
of patent standards and enforcement because of the increasingly global nature of
intellectual property. However, patent law is still territorial, and there is "no such
thing as a 'global patent."'"41 Multinational businesses often seek IP protection in
a variety of jurisdictions. These globalized industries, particularly in developed
nations, have pushed for increased harmonization of patent protection
internationally.14 2 Certain international organizations, such as the WTO and
WIPO, are in a unique position to influence patent regimes internationally and
coordinate a more coherent global approach to patents.
International organizations, in particular the WTO, could potentially
resolve or reconcile differing views of gene patents through a number of
mechanisms. One possibility is for the WTO or WIPO to either amend the
TRIPS agreement or draft a new substantive patent treaty. However, this
approach is extremely unlikely given that past efforts have failed. If there is no
feasible means of enforcing a single standard for gene patents, then perhaps the
next best solution is ensuring that patent holders' rights are protected and that
patients have access without paying costs grossly in excess of marginal cost.
Again, in recognition of the unlikelihood that any global agreement would
succeed, an alternative may be able to ensure a more even approach to the
diagnostic tests and products that gene patents protect. This approach might
entail member states taking advantage of the inherent flexibilities in the TRIPS
and WIPO agreements to resolve any international gene patent conflicts within
their own territories. This approach may not be effective: after all, countries
have been able to exploit flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement for years, which
include using compulsory licenses and excluding certain subject matter from
patentability. Few countries, however, have taken advantage of these
flexibilities.1 43

141

Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 154 (quoting

MARTINJ. ADELMAN ET AL., G.OBAL ISSUES IN

PATENT LAw 3 (2011)).
142
143

Seeid.at 156.
After the signing of TRIPS, governments were unsure about the use of compulsory licensing. The
2001 Doha Declaration clarified that developing nations were to use compulsory licenses to
provide access to technology for public health. However, research suggests the Doha Declaration
did little to encourage more compulsory license use. Only 24 compulsory licenses for
pharmaceuticals issued between January 1995 and June 2011; since 2006, compulsory licensing
activity has largely diminished. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticalssince the Doha Declaration:A Database Analysis, PLoS Med. 9(1) (2012), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%/ 3Adoi/ 2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001154.
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1. Use international organizations for substantive patent uniformity.
Within the WTO, amendments or new treaties are unlikely to pass.
Previous attempts to amend the TRIPS agreement have failed, including
attempts to address the issue of gene patents. WTO members discussed the
issue in 2010 after Bolivia introduced an amendment proposing a ban on patents
of life forms." The Council discussed concerns about whether life forms should
be eligible for patenting, but the amendment died on the floor. 4 5 The debate
over the scope of patent exceptions was also prevalent in the talks that resulted
in the Doha Declaration.' 46 Some states argued that Article 27.3(b) should be
amended "in light of the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity)" and that
"the present review should clarify that the following are not patentable: all living
organisms (including whole or parts or plants and animals and importantly,
including gene sequences), biological and other natural processes for producing
plants, animals and their parts."l4 7 However, members never agreed upon this
amendment.148

Discussions have continued for years since TRIPS was first enacted, but
WTO members continue to disagree about how best to address the recognized
problem of biopiracyl 4 9 -let alone the somewhat newer concern over human
gene patents. Previous years of debate and the lack of any formal response from
the WTO suggest that the WTO is unlikely to reach any sort of consensus in the
near future. Additionally, the TRIPS agreement suffers from a "law-making
deficit because of the rarity and non-precedential character of WTO panel
decisions,"' further suggesting how unlikely is it that the WTO will exert its
144

SCee
generaly Council for the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review ofArticle
27.3(B) of TRIPS Agreement: Communicationfrom Bolivia, IP/C/W/545 (Feb. 24, 2010), available at
https://docs.wto.org.

145

See generally Coundl DebatesAnti-Counterfeiling Talks, Patents on fJe, WORID TRADE ORGANIZATION
(June 8-9, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news10_e/trip-08jun1O e.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,

146

147

148
149

Iso

WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001).
Members Start Work on Doha Agenda Items, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (March 5-7, 2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news02 e/trips-reg-020307_e.htm.
See id.
For example, a number of WTO members, including Brazil, India, and several developing
nations, argued that TRIPS is not supportive of the Convention on Biological Diversity. In 2011,
a draft including an amendment to TRIPS was created to enhance the supportiveness between the
two instruments. Members have yet to agree on these changes. See World Trade Organization,
Draft decision to enhance mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS Agreement and the
(April 19, 2011), available at
Convention on Biological Diversity, TN/C/W/59
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.aspDDFDocuments/ t/tn/c/W59.doc.
Strandburg, supra note 8, at 906.
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law-making powers in such a controversial fashion so as to exclude from
patentability subject matter that some members currently allow.
2. Rely on the flexibilities inherent in TRIPS to ensure access to
diagnostic tests covered by gene patents.
Because it seems increasingly unlikely that either nations themselves or the
WTO or WIPO will achieve uniform gene patent policies in the near future, a
second possibility could still ensure that the products and diagnostic tests
protected by gene patents are available in a more uniform fashion to patients
around the world. Within the framework of the TRIPS agreement and various
WIPO treaties, countries have flexibility both to determine the scope of
patentable subject matter and to use the option of compulsory licensing to
ensure the availability of technology in the public interest. It should be noted
that these very flexibilities can work against harmonization of patent regimes by
ensuring that countries still retain the ability to tailor their patent regimes to
idiosyncratic cultural and political needs. However, when the concern is the
availability of technology, these flexibilities can allow a country to refuse to
patent certain restrictive technologies or issue compulsory licenses to ensure that
the technology is available at a relatively cheap price to its people.
During the negotiations of the TRIPS agreement, developed and
developing nations often had opposing interests. Developed nations advocated
harmonization and strong protection, whereas developing nations advocated
flexibility to lower protection."' While developed nations' strong views and
potentially coercive tacticsl 52 led to TRIPS's relatively high minimum level of
protection, the agreement does retain flexibilities to accommodate developing
nations' desires. Due to these flexibilities, countries can exclude certain subject
matter from patentability and they can issue compulsory licenses. 5
Patents must be available to all technologies without discrimination under
the TRIPS agreement.1 54 Nonetheless, nations are afforded some flexibility to
differentiate between industries, and TRIPS even includes explicit exceptions to
the uniform grant of patent rights."' The WTO has accepted some deviations
for specific industries, most notably the pharmaceutical industry: it explicitly
151
152

See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 166.
"[Imhe United States has been criticized for using coercive negotiating techniques to gain the
consensus of developing countries. In particular, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative threatened countries with trade retaliations under Special 301 Report if they chose
to object to the negotiating positions of the United States on intellectual property rights in the
TRIPS agreement." Id. at 166-67.
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See id. at 164.
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See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.1.
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See id.
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requires the recognition of pharmaceutical patents even in developing nations
where the patents have not yet been granted.' By exploiting this flexibility,
countries could refuse entirely to patent genes or to allow a subset of gene
patents.
Some countries have taken advantage of the flexibility to exclude certain
subject matter from patentability. India in particular has been leading this charge,
passing laws that exclude certain chemicals from patentability and allowing
compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products.' However, countries are
under mounting pressure to increase patent protection. Nations can face
negative consequences if they take advantage of the flexibilities in TRIPS too
aggressively. For instance, nations known to be hostile to patent protection are
likely to have trouble attracting biotechnology firms and may hurt their chances
of obtaining a fair licensing agreement for access to these technologies.'
Moreover, if a nation exploits the flexibilities too aggressively, it may violate
TRIPS and face potential retribution in unrelated trade matters.' The threat of
sanctions contributes to a culture of overcompliance that discourages countries
from experimenting with flexibilities protected under TRIPS.'
A more feasible alternative would be for countries to take advantage of
TRIPS Article 31(f)'s provision for compulsory licensing when necessary for
public health."' In the past, compulsory licenses have issued for
pharmaceuticals, albeit infrequently, but there is no reason they could not for
genetic diagnostic tests as well. 6 2 Article 31 permits compulsory licensing
"where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by
government ... a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual
merits."163
Despite their availability under TRIPS, compulsory licenses are
infrequently used. After the initial implementation of TRIPS, the international
community was uncertain of when and where compulsory licenses may be

156

157

158
15
160
161

See id. art. 70.8-9 (requiring countries, even those that have not yet made pharmaceuticals eligible
for patent protection, to make certain provisions for filing of pharmaceutical patents).
See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 180.
See EconomicAnalysis ofthe Impact ofIsolated Human Gene Patents, supra note 26, at 121-23.
See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 170.
See Molly Land, RebalancingTRIPS, 33 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 433, 434 (2012).
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(f).
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See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 180.

163

TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
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issued.164 However, even after the WTO clarified the use of compulsory licenses
in the interest of public health, their number remains low.' In practice, WTO
panels have interpreted the exceptions narrowly in formal dispute resolutions.' 6
This places the burden on developing countries to defend their invocation of an
exception.'16
Some nations have taken advantage of the compulsory license option
under TRIPS. For example, India issued a compulsory license in March 2012 for
the cancer drug Nexavar (manufactured by Bayer).168 In the spring of 2013, India
took steps towards issuing compulsory licenses for three more cancer drugs,'6 9
but other nations have received negative reactions after issuing compulsory
licenses. In 2008, for example, after issuing compulsory licenses for four cancer
drugs, Thailand was criticized for interpreting TRIPS more broadly than
intended."o Given the "stiff opposition by patent holders to the granting of
compulsory licenses," many states would prefer to avoid a confrontation with
patent holders (who are often backed by their governments)."' Additionally, due
to the small number of biotechnology firms that control the majority of patents,
states are often reluctant to enter into disputes that may limit their future access
to patented innovations. 172
B. A Pragmatic Approach to Gene Patent Harmonization
While substantive harmonization of patent regimes may be difficult and
years away, independent licensing agreements offer a realistic possibility for
tempering the restrictive practices of patent holders and helping to facilitate

"Following the adoption of TRIPS in 1995, the novelty of the agreement and its hard-tounderstand text left developing countries uncertain of their right to promote access to essential
medicines." Peter Maybarduk & Sarah Rimmington, Compulsory licenses: A Tool to Improve Global
Access to the HPV Vaccine, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 328 (2009).
165 See Beall & Kuhn, supra note 143, at 7.
164

166

See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brag-il Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Dispute
DS199, WT/DS199/4; IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001) (requiring Brazil to enter talks with the
U.S. prior to the use of a compulsory license of a U.S. product).
167 See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 70, at 180.
168

169

See Maricel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory License, for Bayer Cancer Drug, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grants-first-compulsory-licencefor-bayer-cancer-drug/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
See Wasserman Rajec, supranote 70, at 180.
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See Tejavanija, supra note 10, at 673.
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M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, in

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GooDs AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIIZED

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 227,248 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
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See id at 230.
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greater uniformity in patent regimes. More extensive and coordinated use of
voluntary licensing would provide a degree of certainty for patent holders that
their rights would be protected, while also ensuring that patients in both
developed and developing nations have access to biotechnology at a lower cost.
In most instances, patent holders have the incentive to enter into
negotiations to reach voluntary agreements for licensing IP rights. Studies show
that patentees are often provided sufficient compensation to recover R&D costs
through the royalties received from voluntary licenses."' In comparison to
compulsory licensing, independent voluntary licensing allows for terms to be
negotiated that were agreed by both parties, rather than having terms imposed
through the granting of a compulsory license.17 4 Independent voluntary licenses
are preferable to both monopolistic restrictions that limit use of a patent and the
alternative of compulsory licensing. In light of these advantages, this Comment
advocates the use of independent voluntary licensing agreements under the
supervision and coordination of WIPO and the WTO, which are best situated to
reduce the transaction costs associated with coordinating licensing of multiple
organizations with many nations."'
1. Promote the use of independent licensing agreements.
Individual biotech firms are better positioned than governments to grant
licenses that address concerns about access costs yet still allow the firms to
recoup the costs of R&D. The formation of contract-based institutions such as
patent pools, IP clearinghouses, and open source licensing does not require
waiting for domestic or international law reform."' With private licensing
options, institutions can lower private transaction costs and increase
responsiveness to "varied and dynamic local conditions," as compared to the
"relatively slow-moving, broad-brush instruments available to state actors." 177
As a general matter, intellectual property must reconcile two conflicting
aims: first, to provide innovators with incentives by restricting the use of their

7
14

See id. at 249.
The U.K. proposed this hypothesis to explain its lack of applications for compulsory licenses.
WIPO Secretariat, Survey on Compubsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address AntiCompetitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rzghts, CDIP/4/4 REV./STUDY/INF/5, T 2.2 (2011),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip 4/cdip_4_4_rev study inf
5.pdf.
Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (holding, in the context of
copyrighted sound recordings, that blanket voluntary licensing coordinated by a centralized body
is a desired means of reducing the "prohibitive" transaction costs associated with seeking
"licenses with individual [companies]").

176
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See Hope, supra note 11, at 172.
Id.
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innovation and guaranteeing gains; and second, to protect "society's interest in
allowing maximum use of innovative products by keeping their price low.""' An
innovation policy that encourages both the creation and the diffusion of new
technology strikes the right balance between the "right to exclude and the right
to use innovations.""' Independent licensing can play this role by enhancing
broad access to knowledge and fostering the capability to use the knowledge in
pursuit of a multiplicity of economically and socially beneficial activities.
Licensing agreements consist of the authorization to use a patent "rented
out by the owner of an intellectual right," which in the context of gene patents is
most often the patent-holding biotechnology firm.'1s Patent owners are
"effectively free to dictate the terms of use of an established test" and thus may
choose to license it broadly and ask for a reasonable royalty."' This would be the
ideal situation. However, patent holders may also choose to restrict the license
to only a select number of laboratories or even a single laboratory and demand
high royalties that increase the cost of genetic tests for patients.' 82
Restrictive licensing is the largest potential pitfall of relying on individual
biotech firms to issue independent licensing agreements. Cases of restrictive
licensing or refusals to license have generated controversy and disapproval
because of the potential adverse effects on public health. Human gene patents
for diagnostic tests are a particularly acute problem in this area. Myriad came
under public scrutiny over its refusal to issue licenses in multiple countries, thus
creating a monopoly with high costs for their genetic tests for BRCA1/2
screening." Such restrictions can increase inequalities in access to health care
and genetic testing across jurisdictions, which conflicts with the principle of
access to medical care in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'84
2. International
agreements.

organizations

intervene

to

coordinate

licensing

International organizations can overcome the potential problems inherent
in relying on voluntary licensing agreements by enforcing and settling disputes.
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17

Id. at 482.
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Genes and Genetic DiagnosticMethods, 13 NATURE RiWv. 441, 445 (2012).
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First, international organizations such as WIPO and the WTO can overcome the
transaction costs inherent in organizing voluntary licensing agreements. Second,
they have the weight to pressure countries to allow licensing agreements in
developing nations where firms may otherwise be less willing to license. Further,
international organizations can enforce and settle disputes when a firm engages
in restrictive licensing with the hopes of creating high costs of genetic tests.
At the most general level, institutions "create the capability for states to
cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and
enforcing agreements."185 Intergovernmental organizations, such as the WTO,
are able to provide public goods to members by promoting rules to regulate
fairness in competition-an advantage for intergovernmental organizations
compared to individual states or firms."' These organizations are in a unique
position to resolve the conflict over human gene patents by stepping in and
coordinating licensing in order to promote fairness in competition and ensure
access to diagnostic tests that are necessary for human health.
International organizations have already "stressed the importance of
avoiding ... conflicts and of promoting consistency among an increasingly
complex and overlapping set of treaty commitments and soft laws." 187
Furthermore, they are already familiar with coordinating policy. The World
Health Organization (WHO), the WTO, and WIPO have previously coordinated
policy reports in order to "contribute to enhancing the empirical and factual
information basis for policy makers and supporting them in addressing public
During the recent Trilateral
health in relation to intellectual property."'
Symposium in 2013, these
Public
Health,
IP,
and
Trade
Cooperation on
organizations discussed the importance of developing "work sharing,"
particularly in the field of biotechnology where "often small and medium size
biotechnology companies ... do basic or specialized research ... and license out
the R&D results.""' Both the WTO and WIPO, then, are familiar with
coordinating intellectual property offices and have openly encouraged global
cooperation."
185 JORDAN & FID,supra note 79, at 236.
186 See id
187 Helfer, supra note 102, at 72.
188

WHO, WIPO, WITO Trilateral Cooperation on Public Health, IP and Trade, WORLD INTEU.EcTUAL
http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/global-health/trilateral
ORGANIZATION,
PROPERTY
cooperation.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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TRADE ORGANIZATION (June 14, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/newsl 3e/
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See Global Cooperation, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/
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The WTO and WIPO have also worked together in other situations to
ensure cooperation. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the related
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources are examples of collaboration
by international organizations to ensure access to patented technology."' As part
of the Convention, member countries have signed on to participate in
information sharing of patented technologies relating to biological diversity. The
Protocol also created the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearinghouse as part of
the agreement to provide a means of access and benefit sharing.192 The WTO
has continued to hold meetings to ensure that the Clearinghouse is making
progress and that nations are participating. Because information-sharing
agreements have been used in the past, they could provide a feasible framework
for the development of a similar arrangement concerning gene patents and other
public health technologies.
Alternatively, WIPO and the WTO could look to certain informal
collaborations as examples of how to promote the disclosure of particular gene
patent sequences. The DNA Databank of Japan and the European Nucleotide
Archives have experienced limited success in sharing nucleotide-based patent
sequences.'93 However, the WTO and WIPO might carry much more weight
and can coordinate and build upon these already existing databases.
International organizations, including the WTO and WIPO, are also in the
best position to prevent the kind of restrictive licensing that characterized the
dispute over Myriad's BRCA sequences. When coordination occurs, economic
activity is not solely based on "perceptions of price advantages within individual
transactions," but is instead influenced by consciousness of the value of
membership in the organization.' 94 Membership in the WTO or WIPO is
valuable for states. As such, these organizations can influence the cooperation of
firms that are often backed by their governments. Due to their unique power to

191 See Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 1, 5, 15, 18, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; 31 I.L.M.
818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD].
192
See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision X/15, available
at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=12281 (establishing the Clearing-House
Mechanism). As part of the agreement, members of the Convention agreed to "promote and
cooperate in the use of scientific advances in biological diversity research," CBD, supra note 191,
art. 12; similarly, Article 14 of the Nagoya Protocol requires the creation of a "clearing-house
mechanism" to "serve as a means of sharing of information related to access and benefitsharing." Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from the Utilization of the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14.1, Oct. 29,
2010, availableat http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/.
193

194

See Osmat A. Jefferson, Exploring the Scope of Gene Patents through New Levels of Transparency, WIPO
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2014/02/
MAGAZINE (April 2014),
article 0008.html.
Hope, supranote 11, at 108.
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encourage cooperation and their ability to monitor restrictive licensing practices,
the WTO and WIPO can and should coordinate voluntary, independent
licensing agreements to ensure more even patent access and protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
International organizations, while increasingly seeking to harmonize the
worldwide patent regime, have been unable to resolve the currently fragmented
regime in the field of gene patents. The suggestions of a TRIPS amendment or
increasing use of compulsory licenses are unlikely to prove long-term solutions.
While a new treaty dictating uniform terms of patentability would be ideal, this is
unlikely to occur.
Currently, the most pragmatic solution involves promoting the wider use
of voluntary independent licensing agreements between biotechnology patent
holders and laboratories in other countries. This option would promote the best
interests of patent holders by ensuring they can recoup the high costs of
biotechnology R&D. In addition, this solution offers the best opportunity for
both developed and developing nations to ensure access to valuable genetic
tests. Due to the reasonable fear of restrictive licensing, the WTO and WIPO
have a responsibility to intervene in this effort. By coordinating licensing
agreements and monitoring for overly restrictive practices, the fragmented
patent regimes may be better used to promote international public health.
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